Flappers lJudging by itsow profile on goodreads this book hasn t received anywhere near the attention it deserve This is a compact and well supported examination of the US engagement policy towards anywhere near the attention it deserve This is a compact and well supported examination of the US engagement policy towards It s also refreshingly impartial rather than moralizing or blasting Bush and Reagan Jentleson shows that a preponderance of evidence existed by 1989 1990 that Saddam was not reciprocating US overturesThe basic argument is that the US after tilting towards Ira during the Iran Ira War went for an engagementaccommodation Approach From 1988 To from 1988 to Gulf War to try to incentivize SH to join the family of nations The policy involved agricultural credits the continuation of dual use technology sales encouragement of foreign military sales to Ira overlooking Irai war crimes and oppression intelligence sharing oans and other incentives Jentleson shows that this policy failed for 2 big reasons First Saddam did not reciprocate in virtually any way He continued to threaten his Arab neighbors and Israel He remained determined to build a WMD arsenal and ballistic missile system and got pretty close to doing so He kept gassing and oppressing Irais He kept criticizing "the US in paranoid ways In sum these incentives just never got through to him Even if "US in paranoid ways In sum these incentives just never got through to him Even if had they wouldn t have been enough to dig his way out of the massive debts he had piled up from. The enemy of my enemy as the age old axiom goes is my friend Such was the reasoning behind US strategy when the Reagan administration first tilted towards Ira during the Iran Ira war This same thinking continued and even deepened during the Bush administration up to the very eve of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait when the enemy of my enemy proved that he still could be my enemy too This thoughtful and well documented analysis of US Irai relations confronts such uestions as how and why the Reagan. Mped right into another The thesis a failure to get into his head Instead they relied on mirror image They committed errors for the idea that you could offer minor incentives to get him to act better Policy makers could have appreciated the fact that he both hated and distrusted the US as Hal Brands has shown in recent articles and saw our overtures as mere ploys or tricks that would eventually be followed with overt hostility Trust historians we know our things really wellI iked that Jenlteson didn t treat Reagan and Bush as Evil For Pursuing Engagement for pursuing engagement as Saddam continued his crimes Sometimes you have to try to reach out to really bad guys to see if you can offer something that can moderate their behavior It has worked in other places even with some pretty nasty regimes Where you can fault the Reagan and Bush teams is for not rechecking their assumptions and incorporating new evidence into their view of the policy Rather they stuck stubbornly to the uest to moderate Saddam s behavior without communicating to him the conseuences of aggression We will never know for sure but Jentleson offers some strong evidence that the Gulf War could have been avoided with a different US policy Recommended for all US foreign policy scholars in history and political science especially those working on Ir. S that must be understood as the United States charts its course in the post Cold War world Drawing on scores of declassified documents revealing interviews hearings held by the US Congress and many other sources Professor Bruce Jentleson provides a richly detailed and insightful account of the politics processes and conseuences of US policy towards Ira in these crucial years The miscalculations misunderstandings and mismanagements will provoke and fascinate all serious observers of US foreign polic. .
review With Friends Like These Reagan Bush and Sa.
The war with Iran Only invading a smaller neighbor could do that That brings us to the second major problem with the engagement strategy ack of a deterrent threat The US didn t respond with withdrawal of incentives or threats of retaliation if Ira continued to misbehave Saddam got away with insult after misdeed after crime which probably made him think he COULD GET AWAY WITH A RISKY LAND GRAB GIVEN get away with a risky Silent Empire land grab Given s paranoid borderline irrational mind it s hard to tell if a deterrent threat would have worked but it s clear from this book that it wasn t even triedThis book is a really great example of why policy makers should trust historians above all other disciplines So many of the problems the US ran into with this policy came from political science type thinking which tends to generalize from what an abstract rational actor would do rather than the specific person you areooking at For example a bunch of analysts and policy makers bought into the exhaustion thesis which said that SH won t be aggressive after the Iran Ira War because he s too worn down by that war but will be susceptible to positive incentives eading to moderation of behavior This makes sense if applied to an abstract rational actor but Saddam never really cared whether his people were war weary or his army too run down Within 2 years of the end of one war he ju. Bush strategy of bringing Saddam into the family of nations failed so profoundly Why didn't Ira moderate its behavior Why didn't the United States increase its influence Might the whole Gulf War have been avoided These uestions push beyond the revelations of the Ira gate scandal to get at the most fundamental flaws in the Reagan Bush strategy Irrespective of the military success in the Gulf War which followed there are important essons to be Tanya Jawab Lengkap Permasalahan Jual Beli learned about why the war occurred foreign policyesson.